In re Primus
In re Edna Smith PRIMUS, Appellant.
No. 77-56.
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued Jan. 16, 1978.
Decided May 30, 1978.
Mr. Justice POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
We consider on this appeal whether a State may punish a member of its Bar who, seeking to
further political and ideological goals through associational activity, including
litigation, advises a lay person of her legal rights and discloses in a subsequent letter
that free legal assistance is available from a nonprofit organization with which the
lawyer and her associates are affiliated. Appellant, a member of the Bar of South
Carolina, received a public reprimand for writing such a letter. The appeal is opposed by
the State Attorney General, on behalf of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and
Discipline of the Supreme Court of South Carolina. As this appeal presents a substantial
question under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as interpreted in NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415, 83 S.Ct. 328, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963), we noted probable jurisdiction.
I
Appellant, Edna Smith Primus, is a lawyer practicing in Columbia, S. C. During the period
in question, she was associated with the "Carolina Community Law Firm," [FN1]
and was an officer of and cooperating lawyer with the Columbia branch of the American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). [FN2] She re ceived no compensation for her work on behalf
of the ACLU, [FN3] but was paid a retainer as a legal consultant for the South Carolina
Council on Human Relations (Council), a nonprofit organization with offices in Columbia.
FN1. The court below determined that the Carolina Community Law Firm was " 'an
expense sharing arrangement with each attorney keeping his own fees.' " 268 S.C. 259,
261, 233 S.E.2d 301, 302 (1977). The firm later changed its name to Buhl, Smith &
Bagby.
FN2. The ACLU was organized in 1920 by individuals who had worked in the defense of the
rights of conscientious objectors during World War I and political dissidents during the
postwar period. It views itself as a "national non-partisan organization defending
our Bill of Rights for all without distinction or compromise." ACLU, Presenting the
American Civil Liberties Union 2 (1948). The organization's activities range from
litigation and lobbying to educational campaigns in support of its avowed goals. See
Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change: Perspectives on Public Interest Law, 28 Stan.L.Rev. 207,
211-212 (1976); Note, Private Attorneys- General: Group Action in the Fight for Civil
Liberties, 58 Yale L.J. 574, 576 (1949); see also App. 185-186. See generally C. Markmann,
The Noblest Cry: A History of the American Civil Liberties Union (1965); D. Johnson, The
Challenge to American Freedoms: World War I and the Rise of the American Civil Liberties
Union (1963).
FN3. Although all three lawyers in the Carolina Community Law Firm
maintained some association with the ACLU--appellant and Carlton Bagby as unsalaried
cooperating lawyers, and Herbert Buhl as staff counsel-- appellant testified that
"the firm did not handle any litigation for [the] ACLU." App. 134.
During the summer of 1973, local and national newspapers reported that pregnant mothers on
public assistance in Aiken County, S. C., were being sterilized or threatened with
sterilization as a condition of the continued receipt of medical assistance under the
Medicaid program. [FN4] Concerned by this development, Gary Allen, an Aiken businessman
and officer of a local organization serving indigents, called the Council requesting that
one of its representatives come to Aiken to address some of the women who had been
sterilized. At the Council's behest, appellant, who had not known Allen previously, called
him and arranged a meeting in his office in July 1973. Among those attending was Mary Etta
Williams, who had been sterilized by Dr. Clovis H. Pierce after the birth of her third
child. Williams and her grandmother attended the meeting because Allen, an old family
friend, had invited them and because Williams wanted "[t]o see what it was all about
. . . ." App. 41-42. At the meeting, appellant advised those present, including
Williams and the other women who had been sterilized by Dr. Pierce, of their legal rights
and suggested the possibility of a lawsuit.
FN4. See, e. g., 3 Carolina Doctors Are Under Inquiry in Sterilization of Welfare Mothers,
New York Times, July 22, 1973, p. 30, cols. 1-3.
Early in August 1973 the ACLU informed appellant that it was willing to provide
representation for Aiken mothers who had been sterilized. [FN5] Appellant testified that
after being advised by Allen that Williams wished to institute suit against Dr. Pierce,
she decided to inform Williams of the ACLU's offer of free legal representation. Shortly
after receiving appellant's letter, dated August 30, 1973 [FN6]--the centerpiece of this
litigation--Williams visited Dr. Pierce to discuss the progress of her third child who was
ill. At the doctor's office, she encountered his lawyer and at the latter's request signed
a release of liability in the doctor's favor. Williams showed appellant's letter to the
doctor and his lawyer, and they retained a copy. She then called appellant from the
doctor's office and announced her intention not to sue. There was no further communication
between appellant and Williams.
FN5. App. 94-95, 131-133, 135-137; Brief for Appellee 8.
FN6. Written on the stationery of the Carolina Community Law Firm, the letter stated:
August 30, 1973
Mrs. Marietta Williams
347 Sumter Street
Aiken, South Carolina 29801
Dear Mrs. Williams:
You will probable remember me from talking with you at Mr. Allen's office in July about
the sterilization performed on you. The American Civil Liberties Union would like to file
a lawsuit on your behalf for money against the doctor who performed the operation. We will
be coming to Aiken in the near future and would like to explain what is involved so you
can understand what is going on.
Now I have a question to ask of you. Would you object to talking to a women's magazine
about the situation in Aiken? The magazine is doing a feature story on the whole
sterilization problem and wants to talk to you and others in South Carolina. If you don't
mind doing this, call me collect at 254-8151 on Friday before 5:00, if you receive this
letter in time. Or call me on Tuesday morning (after Labor Day) collect.
I want to assure you that this interview is being done to show what is happening to women
against their wishes, and is not being done to harm you in any way. But I want you to
decide, so call me collect and let me know of your decision. This practice must stop.
About the lawsuit, if you are interested, let me know, and I'll let you
know when we will come down to talk to you about it. We will be coming to talk to Mrs.
Waters at the same time; she has already asked the American Civil Liberties Union to file
a suit on her behalf.
Sincerely,
s/ Edna Smith
Edna Smith
Attorney-at-law
App. 3-4.
On October 9, 1974, the Secretary of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and
Discipline of the Supreme Court of South Carolina (Board) filed a formal complaint with
the Board, charging that appellant had engaged in "solicitation in violation of the
Canons of Ethics" by sending the August 30, 1973, letter to Williams. App. 1-2.
Appellant denied any unethical solicitation and asserted, inter alia, that her conduct was
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments and by Canon 2 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility of the American Bar Association (ABA). The complaint was heard
by a panel of the Board on March 20, 1975. The State's evidence consisted of the letter,
the testimony of Williams, [FN7] and a copy of the summons and complaint in the action
instituted against Dr. Pierce and various state officials, Walker v. Pierce, Civ. No.
74-475 (SC, July 28, 1975), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 560 F.2d 609 (CA4 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1075, 98 S.Ct. 1266, 55 L.Ed.2d 782 (1978). [FN8] Following denial
of appellant's motion to dismiss, App. 77-82, she testified in her own behalf and called
Allen, a number of ACLU representatives, and several character witnesses. [FN9]
FN7. Williams testified that at the July meeting appellant advised her of her legal
remedies, of the possibility of a lawsuit if her sterilization had been coerced, and of
appellant's willingness to serve as her lawyer without compensation. Williams recounted
that she had told appellant that because her child was in critical condition, she
"did not have time for" a lawsuit and "would contact [appellant] some
more." She also denied that she had expressed to Allen an interest in suing her
doctor. Id., at 29- 34, 58. On cross-examination, however, Williams confirmed an earlier
statement she had made in an affidavit that appellant "did not attempt to persuade or
pressure me to file [the] lawsuit." Id., at 52. See n. 28, infra.
FN8. This class action was filed on April 15, 1974, by two Negro women alleging that Dr.
Pierce, in conspiracy with state officials, had sterilized them, or was threatening to do
so, solely on account of their race and number of children, while they
received assistance under the Medicaid program. The complaint sought declaratory and
injunctive relief, damages, and attorney's fees, and asserted violations of the
Constitution and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985(3), and 2000d.
Bagby, one of appellant's associates in the Carolina Community Law Firm and fellow
cooperating lawyer with the ACLU, was one of several attorneys of record for the
plaintiffs. Buhl, another of appellant's associates and a staff counsel for the ACLU in
South Carolina, also may have represented one of the women.
FN9. Appellant also offered to produce expert testimony to the effect that some measure of
solicitation of prospective litigants is necessary in safeguarding the civil liberties of
inarticulate, economically disadvantaged individuals who may not be aware of their legal
rights and of the availability of legal counsel, App. 166-168; that the purpose of the
ACLU is to advance and defend the cause of civil liberties, id., at 183- 186; and that the
ACLU relies on decisions such as NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 83 S.Ct. 328, 9 L.Ed.2d
405 (1963), in advising its attorneys of the extent of constitutional protection for their
litigation activities, App. 187-188. These offers of proof were rejected as not germane to
the disciplinary proceeding.
The panel filed a report recommending that appellant be found guilty of soliciting a
client on behalf of the ACLU, in violation of Disciplinary Rules (DR) 2-103(D)(5)(a) and
(c) [FN10] and 2-104(A)(5) [FN11] of the Supreme Court of South Carolina, [FN12] and that
a private reprimand be issued. It noted that "[t]he evidence is inconclusive as to
whether [appellant] solicited Mrs. Williams on her own behalf, but she did solicit Mrs.
Williams on behalf of the ACLU, which would benefit financially in the event of successful
prosecution of the suit for money damages." The panel determined that appellant
violated DR 2-103(D)(5) "by attempting to solicit a client for a non-profit
organization which, as its primary purpose, renders legal services, where respondent's
associate is a staff counsel for the non-profit organization." Appellant also was
found to have violated DR 2- 104(A)(5) because she solicited Williams, after providing
unsolicited legal advice, to join in a prospective class action for damages and other
relief that was to be brought by the ACLU.
FN10. South Carolina's DR2-103(D) provides:
"(D) A lawyer shall not knowingly assist a person or organization that recommends,
furnishes, or pays for legal services to promote the use of his services or those of his
partners or associates. However, he may cooperate in a dignified manner
with the legal service activities of any of the following, provided that his independent
professional judgment is exercised in behalf of his client without interference or control
by any organization or other person:
"(1) A legal aid office or public defender office:
"(a) Operated or sponsored by a duly accredited law school.
"(b) Operated or sponsored by a bona fide non-profit community organization.
"(c) Operated or sponsored by a governmental agency.
"(d) Operated, sponsored, or approved by a bar association representative of the
general bar of the geographical area in which the association exists.
"(2) A military legal assistance office.
"(3) A lawyer referral service operated, sponsored, or approved by a bar association
representative of the general bar of the geographical area in which the association
exists.
"(4) A bar association representative of the general bar of the geographical area in
which the association exists.
"(5) Any other non-profit organization that recommends, furnishes, or pays for legal
services to its members or beneficiaries, but only in those instances and to the extent
that controlling constitutional interpretation at the time of the
rendition of the services requires the allowance of such legal service activities, and
only if the following conditions, unless prohibited by such interpretation, are met:
"(a) The primary purposes of such organization do not include the rendition of legal
services.
"(b) The recommending, furnishing, or paying for legal services to its members is
incidental and reasonably related to the primary purposes of such organization.
"(c) Such organization does not derive a financial benefit from the rendition of
legal services by the lawyer.
"(d) The member or beneficiary for whom the legal services are rendered, and not such
organization, is recognized as the client of the lawyer in that matter."
FN11. South Carolina's DR2-104(A) provides:
"(A) A lawyer who has given unsolicited advice to a layman that he should obtain
counsel or take legal action shall not accept employment resulting from that advice,
except that:
"(1) A lawyer may accept employment by a close friend, relative, former client (if
the advice is germane to the former employment), or one whom the lawyer reasonably
believes to be a client. "(2) A lawyer may accept employment that
results from his participation in activities designed to educate laymen to recognize legal
problems, to make intelligent selection of counsel, or to utilize available legal services
if such activities are conducted or sponsored by any of the offices or organizations
enumerated in DR 2-103(D)(1) through (5), to the extent and under the conditions
prescribed therein.
"(3) A lawyer who is furnished or paid by any of the offices or organizations
enumerated in DR 2-103(D)(1), (2), or (5) may represent a member or beneficiary thereof to
the extent and under the conditions prescribed therein.
"(4) Without affecting his right to accept employment, a lawyer may speak publicly or
write for publication on legal topics so long as he does not emphasize his own
professional experience or reputation and does not undertake to give individual advice.
"(5) If success in asserting rights or defenses of his client in litigation in the
nature of a class action is dependent upon the joinder of others, a lawyer may accept, but
shall not seek, employment from those contacted for the purpose of obtaining their
joinder."
FN12. Section 4(b) of the Supreme Court of South Carolina's Rule on Disciplinary Procedure
defines misconduct as a "violation of any of the Canons of
Professional Ethics as adopted by this Court from time to time . . . ." 22 S.C.Code,
p. 59 (1977). On March 1, 1973, the state court adopted the ABA's Code of Professional
Responsibility. Rule 32 of the Supreme Court of South Carolina, id., at 48. Although
DR2-103(D) has been revised substantially by the ABA, South Carolina has not adopted that
revision.
After a hearing on January 9, 1976, the full Board approved the panel report and
administered a private reprimand. On March 17, 1977, the Supreme Court of South Carolina
entered an order which adopted verbatim the findings and conclusions of the panel report
and increased the sanction, sua sponte, to a public reprimand. 268 S.C. 259, 233 S.E.2d
301.
On July 9, 1977, appellant filed a jurisdictional statement and this appeal was docketed.
We noted probable jurisdiction on October 3, 1977, sub nom. In re Smith, 434 U.S. 814, 98
S.Ct. 49, 54 L.Ed.2d 69. We now reverse.
II
This appeal concerns the tension between contending values of considerable moment to the
legal profession and to society. Relying upon NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 83 S.Ct.
3289, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963), and its progeny, appellant maintains that her activity
involved constitutionally protected expression and association. In her view, South
Carolina has not shown that the discipline meted out to her advances a subordinating state
interest in a manner that avoids unnecessary abridgment of First Amendment freedoms.
[FN13] Appellee counters that appellant's letter to Williams falls outside of the
protection of Button, and that South Carolina acted lawfully in punishing a member of its
Bar for solicitation.
FN13. In addition to her claim of protection under this Court's Button decision, appellant
contends that (i) the State's failure to give her fair notice of the precise charges
leveled against her in the disciplinary proceeding worked a violation of due process, see
In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 20 L.Ed.2d 117 (1968); (ii) the absence of
proof of essential elements of the Disciplinary Rules also violated due process, see
Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 80 S.Ct. 624, 4 L.Ed.2d 654 (1960); and (iii) the
Disciplinary Rules are void for vagueness under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, see
Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964). In view of
our disposition of this case, we do not reach these contentions.
The States enjoy broad power to regulate "the practice of professions within their
boundaries," and "[t]he interest of the States in regulating lawyers is
especially great since lawyers are essential to the primary governmental function of
administering justice, and have historically been 'officers of the courts.' "
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792, 95 S.Ct. 2004, 2016, 44 L.Ed.2d 572
(1975). For example, we decide today in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447, 98
S.Ct. 1912, 56 L.Ed.2d 444, that the States may vindicate legitimate regulatory interests
through proscription, in certain circumstances, of in-person solicitation by lawyers who
seek to communicate purely commercial offers of legal assistance to lay persons.
Unlike the situation in Ohralik, however, appellant's act of solicitation took the form of
a letter to a woman with whom appellant had discussed the possibility of seeking redress
for an allegedly unconstitutional sterilization. This was not in-person solicitation for
pecuniary gain. Appellant was communicating an offer of free assistance by attorneys
associated with the ACLU, not an offer predicated on entitlement to a share of any
monetary recovery. And her actions were undertaken to express personal political beliefs
and to advance the civil-liberties objectives of the ACLU, rather than to derive financial
gain. The question presented in this case is whether, in light of the values protected by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments, these differences materially affect the scope of
state regulation of the conduct of lawyers.
III
In NAACP v. Button, supra, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia had held that the
activities of members and staff attorneys of the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People (NAACP) and its affiliate, the Virginia State Conference of NAACP
Branches (Conference), constituted "solicitation of legal business" in violation
of state law. NAACP v. Harrison, 202 Va. 142, 116 S.E.2d 55 (1960). Although the NAACP
representatives and staff attorneys had "a right to peaceably assemble with the
members of the branches and other groups to discuss with them and advise them relative to
their legal rights in matters concerning racial segregation," the court found no
constitutional protection for efforts to "solicit prospective litigants to authorize
the filing of suits" by NAACP- compensated attorneys. Id., at 159, 116 S.E.2d, at
68-69.
This Court reversed: "We hold that the activities of the NAACP, its affiliates and
legal staff shown on this record are modes of expression and association protected by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments which Virginia may not prohibit, under its power to
regulate the legal profession, as improper solicitation of legal business violative of
[state law] and the Canons of Professional Ethics." 371 U.S., at 428-429, 83 S.Ct.,
at 335. The solicitation of prospective litigants, [FN14] many
of whom were not members of the NAACP or the Conference, for the purpose of furthering the
civil-rights objectives of the organization and its members was held to come within the
right " 'to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas.' "
Id., at 430, 83 S.Ct., at 336, quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460, 78 S.Ct. 1163,
1170, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958).
FN14. The Button Court described the solicitation activities of NAACP members and
attorneys in the following terms:
"Typically, a local NAACP branch will invite a member of the legal staff to explain
to a meeting of parents and children the legal steps necessary to achieve desegregation.
The staff member will bring printed forms to the meeting authorizing him, and other NAACP
or [NAACP Legal] Defense Fund attorneys of his designation, to represent the signers in
legal proceedings to achieve desegregation. On occasion, blank forms have been signed by
litigants, upon the understanding that a member or members of the legal staff, with or
without assistance from other NAACP lawyers, or from the Defense Fund, would handle the
case. It is usual after obtaining authorizations, for the staff lawyer to bring into the
case the other staff members in the area where suit is to be brought, and sometimes to
bring in lawyers from the national organization or the Defense Fund. In effect, then, the
prospective litigant retains not so much a particular attorney as the 'firm' of NAACP and
Defense Fund lawyers . . . .
"These meetings are sometimes prompted by letters and bulletins from the Conference
urging active steps to fight segregation. The Conference has on occasion
distributed to the local branches petitions for desegregation to be signed by parents and
filed with local school boards, and advised branch officials to obtain, as petitioners,
persons willing to 'go all the way' in any possible litigation that may ensue." 371
U.S., at 421-422, 83 S.Ct., at 332.
[1] Since the Virginia statute sought to regulate expressive and associational conduct at
the core of the First Amendment's protective ambit, the Button Court insisted that
"government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity." 371 U.S., at
433, 83 S.Ct., at 338. The Attorney General of Virginia had argued that the law merely (i)
proscribed control of the actual litigation by the NAACP after it was instituted, ibid.,
and (ii) sought to prevent the evils traditionally associated with common-law maintenance,
champerty, and barratry, id., at 438, 83 S.Ct., at 340. [FN15] The Court found inadequate
the first justification because of an absence of evidence of NAACP interference with the
actual conduct of litigation, or neglect or harassment of clients, and because the
statute, as construed, was not drawn narrowly to advance the asserted goal. It rejected
the analogy to the common-law offenses because of an absence of proof that malicious
intent or the prospect of pecuniary gain inspired the NAACP-sponsored litigation. It also
found a lack of proof that a serious danger of conflict of interest marked the
relationship between the NAACP and its member and nonmember Negro litigants. The Court
concluded that "although the [NAACP] has amply shown that its activities fall within
the First Amendment's protections, the State has failed to advance any substantial
regulatory interest in the form of substantive evils flowing from [the NAACP's]
activities, which can justify the broad prohibitions which it has imposed." Id., at
444, 83 S.Ct., at 343. [FN16]
FN15. Put simply, maintenance is helping another prosecute a suit; champerty is
maintaining a suit in return for a financial interest in the outcome; and barratry is a
continuing practice of maintenance or champerty. See generally 4 W. Blackstone,
Commentaries * 134-136; Zimroth, Group Legal Services and the Constitution, 76 Yale L.J.
966, 969-970 (1967); Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 Calif.L.Rev. 48 (1935).
FN16. Whatever the precise limits of the holding in Button, the Court at least found
constitutionally protected the activities of NAACP members and staff lawyers in
"advising Negroes of their constitutional rights, urging them to institute litigation
of a particular kind, recommending particular lawyers and financing such litigation."
371 U.S., at 447, 83 S.Ct., at 345 (WHITE, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). In the following Term, the Court noted that Button presented an
"occasion to consider an . . . attempt by Virginia to enjoin the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People from advising prospective litigants to seek the
assistance of particular attorneys. In fact, . . . the attorneys were actually employed by
the association which recommended them and recommendations were made even to
nonmembers." Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 7, 84 S.Ct. 1113, 1117,
12 L.Ed.2d 89 (1964); see Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Assn., 389 U.S. 217, 221, 222-223,
88 S.Ct. 353, 356 (1967).
The dissent of Mr. Justice REHNQUIST suggests that Button is distinguishable from this
case because there "lawyers played only a limited role" in the solicitation of
prospective litigants, and "the Commonwealth did not attempt to discipline the
individual lawyers . . . ." Post, at 1911, and n. 3. We do not think that Button can
be read in this way. As the Button Court recognized, see n. 14, supra, and as the Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals had found, NAACP v. Harrison, 202 Va. 142, 154- 155, 116 S.E.2d
55, 65 (1960), NAACP staff attorneys were involved in the actual solicitation efforts. The
absence of discipline in Button was not due to an absence of lawyer involvement in
solicitation. Indeed, from all that appears, no one was disciplined; the case came to this
Court in the posture of an anticipatory action for declaratory relief.
The state court's decree made quite clear that "the solicitation of legal business by
. . . [NAACP] attorneys, as shown by the evidence," and the acceptance of such
solicited employment by NAACP-compensated attorneys, violated the state ban and the canons
of ethics. Id., at 164, 116 S.E.2d, at 72. We therefore cannot view as dicta Button 's
holding that "the activities of the NAACP . . . legal staff shown on this record are
modes of expression and association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments which
Virginia may not prohibit, under its power to regulate the legal profession, as improper
solicitation of legal business . . . ." 371 U.S., at 428-429, 83 S.Ct., at 335.
[2] Subsequent decisions have interpreted Button as establishing the principle that
"collective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the courts is a
fundamental right within the protection of the First Amendment." United
Transportation Union v. Michigan Bar, 401 U.S. 576, 585, 91 S.Ct. 1076, 1082, 28 L.Ed.2d
339 (1971). See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 376 n. 32, 97 S.Ct. 2691,
2705, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977). The Court has held that the First and Fourteenth Amendments
prevent state proscription of a range of solicitation activities by labor unions seeking
to provide low-cost, effective legal representation to their members. See Railroad
Trainmen v. Virginia Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1113, 12 L.Ed.2d 89 (1964); Mine Workers v.
Illinois Bar Assn., 389 U.S. 217, 88 S.Ct. 353, 19 L.Ed.2d 426 (1967); United
Transportation Union v. Michigan Bar, supra. And "lawyers accepting employment under
[such plans] have a like protection which the State cannot abridge." Railroad
Trainmen, supra, 377 U.S., at 8, 84 S.Ct., at 1118. Without denying the power of the State
to take measures to correct the substantive evils of undue influence, overreaching,
misrepresentation, invasion of privacy, conflict of interest, and lay interference that
potentially are present in solicitation of prospective clients by lawyers, this Court has
required that "broad rules framed to protect the public and to preserve respect for
the administration of justice" must not work a significant impairment of "the
value of associational freedoms." Mine Workers, supra, 389 U.S. at 222, 88 S.Ct. at
356.
IV
We turn now to the question whether appellant's conduct implicates interests of free
expression and association sufficient to justify the level of protection recognized in
Button and subsequent cases. [FN17] The Supreme Court of South Carolina found appellant to
have engaged in unethical conduct because she " 'solicit[ed] a client for a
non-profit organization, which, as its primary purpose, renders legal services, where
respondent's associate is a staff counsel for the non-profit organization.' " 268
S.C., at 269, 233 S.E.2d, at 306. [FN18] It rejected appellant's First Amendment defenses
by distinguishing Button from the case before it. Whereas the NAACP in that case was
primarily a " 'political' " organization that used " 'litigation as an
adjunct to the overriding political aims of the organization,' " the ACLU " 'has
as one of its primary purposes the rendition of legal services.' " Id., at 268, 269,
233 S.E.2d, at 305, 306. The court also intimated that the ACLU's policy of requesting an
award of counsel fees indicated that the organization might " 'benefit financially in
the event of successful prosecution of the suit for money damages.' " Id., at 263,
233 S.E.2d, at 303.
FN17. Appellee "finds no fault in Appellant's conduct in meeting with the women to
advise them of their legal rights, even if such advice was unsolicited. There is no doubt
that such activity is protected under the First Amendment." Brief for Appellee 30.
FN18. In the discussion that follows, we do not treat separately the two Disciplinary
Rules upon which appellant's violation was based. Since DR 2- 103(D)(5) was held by the
court below to proscribe in a narrower fashion the same conduct as DR 2-104(A)(5), see n.
26, infra, a determination of unconstitutionality as to the former would subsume the
latter.
Although the disciplinary panel did not permit full factual development of the aims and
practices of the ACLU, see n. 9, supra, the record does not support the state court's
effort to draw a meaningful distinction between the ACLU and the NAACP. From all that
appears, the ACLU and its local chapters, much like the NAACP and its local affiliates in
Button, "[engage] in extensive educational and lobbying activities" and
"also [devote] much of [their] funds and energies to an extensive program of
assisting certain kinds of litigation on behalf of [their] declared purposes." 371
U.S., at 419- 420, 83 S.Ct., at 331. See App. 177-178; n. 2, supra. The court below
acknowledged that " 'the ACLU has only entered cases in which substantial civil
liberties questions are involved . . . .' " 268 S.C., at 263, 233 S.E.2d, at 303. See
Button, 371 U.S., at 440 n. 19, 83 S.Ct., at 341. It has engaged in the defense of
unpopular causes and unpopular defendants [FN19] and has represented individuals in
litigation that has defined the scope of constitutional protection in areas such as
political dissent, juvenile rights, prisoners' rights, military law, amnesty, and privacy.
See generally Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change: Perspectives on Public Interest Law, 28
Stan.L.Rev. 207, 210-214 (1976). For the ACLU, as for the NAACP, "litigation is not a
technique of resolving private differences"; it is "a form of political
expression" and "political association." 371 U.S., at 429, 431, 83 S.Ct.,
at 335, 337. [FN20]
FN19. See, e. g., Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927); De Jonge v. Oregon,
299 U.S. 353, 57 S.Ct. 255, 81 L.Ed. 278 (1937); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 59 S.Ct. 954,
83 L.Ed. 1423 (1939); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 73 S.Ct. 215, 97 L.Ed. 216
(1952); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 29 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968);
Oestereich v. Selective Service Bd., 393 U.S. 233, 89 S.Ct. 414, 21 L.Ed.2d 402 (1968).
FN20. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the ACLU or its South Carolina
affiliate is an organization dedicated exclusively to the provision of legal services. See
n. 2, supra. Nor does the record support any inference that either the ACLU or its
affiliate "is a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an
attempt," Eastern Railroad Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S.
127, 144, 81 S.Ct. 523, 532, 5 L.Ed.2d 464 (1961), by a group of attorneys to evade a
valid state rule against solicitation for pecuniary gain. Compare Valentine v.
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 55, 62 S.Ct. 920, 921, 86 L.Ed. 1262 (1942), with New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266, 84 S.Ct. 710, 718, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). Cf.
California Transport v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 515, 92 S.Ct.
609, 614, 30 L.Ed.2d 642 (1972).
We find equally unpersuasive any suggestion that the level of constitutional scrutiny in
this case should be lowered because of a possible benefit to the ACLU. The discipline
administered to appellant was premised solely on the possibility of financial benefit to
the organization, rather than any possibility of pecuniary gain to herself, her
associates, or the lawyers representing the plaintiffs in the Walker v. Pierce litigation.
[FN21] It is conceded that appellant received no compensation for any of the activities in
question. It is also undisputed that neither the ACLU nor any lawyer associated with it
would have shared in any monetary recovery by the plaintiffs in Walker v. Pierce. If
Williams had elected to bring suit, and had been represented by staff lawyers for the
ACLU, the situation would have been similar to that in Button, where the lawyers for the
NAACP were "organized as a staff and paid by" that organization. 371 U.S., at
434, 83 S.Ct., at 338, see id., at 457, 83 S.Ct., at 350 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Mine
Workers v. Illinois Bar Assn., 389 U.S., at 222-223, 88 S.Ct., at 356; n. 16, supra.
[FN22]
FN21. Appellee conjectures that appellant would have received increased support from
private foundations if her reputation was enhanced as a result of her
efforts in the cause of the ACLU. The decision below acknowledged, however, that the
evidence did not support a finding that appellant solicited Williams on her own behalf.
268 S.C., at 263, 233 S.E.2d, at 303. Since the discipline in this case was premised
solely on the possibility that appellant's solicitation might have conferred a financial
benefit on the ACLU, ibid., and any award of counsel fees would have been received only
for the organization's benefit, see n. 24, infra, we also attach no significance to the
fact that two of the attorneys in the Doe v. Pierce litigation were associated with
appellant in an arrangement for sharing office expenses. See nn. 1, 8, supra.
FN22. "The Virginia State Conference of [NAACP] Branches or petitioner pays the fees
and expenses of the attorneys when they are handling a case involving discrimination,
supported by the state or the national organization . . . . A fee of $60 per day is paid
to the attorneys . . . who are almost invariably members of the legal staff." Brief
for Petitioner in NAACP v. Gray, O.T.1962, No. 5, pp. 9-10.
Contrary to appellee's suggestion, the ACLU's policy of requesting an award of counsel
fees does not take this case outside the protection of Button. Although the Court in
Button did not consider whether the NAACP seeks counsel fees, such requests are often made
both by that organization, see, e. g., NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614, 622 (CA5 1974);
Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 371 F.Supp. 507, 523 (D.C.Mass.), aff'd, 504 F.2d
1017 (CA1 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910, 95 S.Ct. 1561, 43 L.Ed.2d 775 (1975), and by
the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Inc., see, e. g., Bradley v. Richmond School Board, 416 U.S.
696, 94 S.Ct. 2006, 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974); Reynolds v. Coomey, 567 F.2d 1166, 1167 (CA1
1978). In any event, in a case of this kind there are differences between counsel fees
awarded by a court and traditional fee-paying arrangements which militate against a
presumption that ACLU sponsorship of litigation is motivated by considerations of
pecuniary gain rather than by its widely recognized goal of vindicating civil liberties.
Counsel fees are awarded in the discretion of the court; awards are not drawn from the
plaintiff's recovery, and are usually premised on a successful outcome; and the amounts
awarded often may not correspond to fees generally obtainable in private litigation.
Moreover, under prevailing law during the events in question, an award of counsel fees in
federal litigation was available only in limited circumstances. [FN23] And even if there
had been an award during the period in question, it would have gone to the central fund of
the ACLU. [FN24] Although such benefit to the organization may increase with the
maintenance of successful litigation, the same situation obtains with voluntary
contributions and foundation support, which also may rise with ACLU victories in important
areas of the law. That possibility, standing alone, offers no basis for equating the work
of lawyers associated with the ACLU or the NAACP with that of a group that exists for the
primary purpose of financial gain through the recovery of counsel fees. See n. 20, supra.
[FN25]
FN23. In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 95 S.Ct. 1612,
44 L.Ed. 141 (1975), the Court held that a federal court may not award counsel fees in the
absence of specific statutory authorization, a showing of "bad faith" in the
conduct of the litigation, or facts giving rise to a "common fund" or
"common benefit" recovery. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
anticipated our ruling in Alyeska. See Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond, 472
F.2d 318, 327-331 (1972), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 416 U.S. 696, 94 S.Ct.
2006, 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974); Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond, 345 F.2d 310,
321 (1965).
FN24. Appellant informs us that the ACLU policy then in effect provided that cooperating
lawyers associated with the ACLU or with an affiliate could not receive an award of
counsel fees for services rendered in an ACLU-sponsored litigation. Reply Brief for
Appellant 4-5; see App. 173- 175, 181-183; 1976 Policy Guide of the
American Civil Liberties Union, Policy # 512, p. 302:
"Under no circumstances may any cooperating attorney associated in any way with an
ACLU or affiliate case receive payment for services rendered in such a case, whether as a
fee or voluntary donation. The smallest exception to this rule would jeopardize the
voluntary nature of the cooperating system and the effectiveness of ACLU's entire legal
program."
Apparently it was feared that allowing acceptance of such fees might lead to selection of
clients and cases for pecuniary reasons. See App. 182.
This policy was changed in 1977 to permit local experimentation with the sharing of
court-awarded fees between state affiliates and cooperating attorneys. The South Carolina
chapter has not exercised that option. Reply Brief for Appellant 5-6. We express no
opinion whether our analysis in this case would be different had the latter policy been in
effect during the period in question.
FN25. The Internal Revenue Service has announced certain requirements for "public
interest law firms" that seek tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3). Such an organization (i) may not accept fees
from its clients as compensation for services rendered; (ii) may accept fees "in
public interest cases" only if such fees are awarded by a court or
administrative agency; (iii) may "not use the likelihood or probability of a fee
award as a consideration in its selection of cases" ; (iv) may not defray "more
than 50 percent of the total cost of its legal functions" from awarded fees, unless
an exemption is granted; (v) may not permit payment of awarded fees directly to individual
staff attorneys; and (vi) may not accept awarded fees in circumstances that would result
in any conflict with state law or professional canons of ethics. Rev.Proc. 75-13, § 3,
1975- 1 Cum.Bull. 662. See Rev.Ruls. 75-74 through 75-76, 1975-1 Cum.Bull. 152-155.
[3] Appellant's letter of August 30, 1973, to Mrs. Williams thus comes within the generous
zone of First Amendment protection reserved for associational freedoms. The ACLU engages
in litigation as a vehicle for effective political expression and association, as well as
a means of communicating useful information to the public. See n. 32, infra; cf. Bates v.
State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S., at 364, 97 S.Ct., at 2699; Virginia Pharmacy Board v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 779-780, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 1834, 48 L.Ed.2d
346 (1976) (STEWART, J., concurring). As Button indicates, and as appellant offered to
prove at the disciplinary hearing, see n. 9, supra, the efficacy of litigation as a means
of advancing the cause of civil liberties often depends on the ability to make legal
assistance available to suitable litigants. " 'Free trade in ideas' means free trade
in the opportunity to persuade to action, not merely to describe facts." Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537, 65 S.Ct. 315, 325, 89 L.Ed. 430 (1945). The First and
Fourteenth Amendments require a measure of protection for "advocating lawful means of
vindicating legal rights," Button, 371 U.S., at 437, 83 S.Ct., at 340, including
"advis[ing] another that his legal rights have been infringed and refer[ring] him to
a particular attorney or group of attorneys . . . for assistance," id., at 434, 83
S.Ct., at 338.
V
South Carolina's action in punishing appellant for soliciting a prospective litigant by
mail, on behalf of the ACLU, must withstand the "exacting scrutiny applicable to
limitations on core First Amendment rights . . . ." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
44-45, 96 S.Ct. 612, 646, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976). South Carolina must demonstrate "a
subordinating interest which is compelling," Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S.
516, 524, 80 S.Ct. 412, 416, 4 L.Ed.2d 480 (1960), and that the means employed in
furtherance of that interest are "closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of
associational freedoms." Buckley, supra, 424 U.S., at 25, 96 S.Ct., at 638.
[4] Appellee contends that the disciplinary action taken in this case is part of a
regulatory program aimed at the prevention of undue influence, overreaching,
misrepresentation, invasion of privacy, conflict of interest, lay interference, and other
evils that are thought to inhere generally in solicitation by lawyers of prospective
clients, and to be present on the record before us. Brief for Appellee 37-49. We do not
dispute the importance of these interests. This Court's decision in Button makes clear,
however, that "[b]road prophylactic rules in the area of free expression are
suspect," and that "[p]recision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area
so closely touching our most precious freedoms." 371 U.S., at 438, 83 S.Ct., at 340;
see Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Assn., 389 U.S., at 222-223, 88 S.Ct., at 356. Because of
the danger of censorship through selective enforcement of broad prohibitions, and
"[b]ecause First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may
regulate in [this] area only with narrow specificity." Button, supra, 371 U.S., at
433, 83 S.Ct., at 338.
A
[5] The Disciplinary Rules in question sweep broadly. Under DR 2- 103(D)(5), a lawyer
employed by the ACLU or a similar organization may never give unsolicited advice to a lay
person that he retain the organization's free services, and it would seem that one who
merely assists or maintains a cooperative relationship with the organization also must
suppress the giving of such advice if he or anyone associated with the organization will
be involved in the ultimate litigation. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 32-34. Notwithstanding
appellee's concession in this Court, it is far from clear that a lawyer may communicate
the organization's offer of legal assistance at an informational gathering such as the
July 1973 meeting in Aiken without breaching the literal terms of the Rule. Cf. Memorandum
of Complaint, Apr. 8, 1975, p. 9. [FN26] Moreover, the Disciplinary Rules in question
permit punishment for mere solicitation unaccompanied by proof of any of the substantive
evils that appellee maintains were present in this case. In sum, the Rules in their
present form have a distinct potential for dampening the kind of "cooperative
activity that would make advocacy of litigation meaningful," Button, supra, at 438,
83 S.Ct., at 340, as well as for permitting discretionary enforcement against unpopular
causes.
FN26. DR 2-104(A)(5), as construed below, stands as a separate prohibition even though it
appears in terms to be an exception to DR 2-104(A), which bars only the acceptance of
employment after the giving of unsolicited advice. It was applied in this case to an
attorney who recommended participation in a prospective litigation and who did not accept
any employment.
B
[6] Even if we ignore the breadth of the Disciplinary Rules and the absence of findings in
the decision below that support the justifications advanced by appellee in this Court,
[FN27] we think it clear from the record--which appellee does not suggest is inadequately
developed-- that findings compatible with the First Amendment could not have been made in
this case. As in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284-285, 84 S.Ct. 710, 728,
11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), "considerations of effective judicial administration require
us to review the evidence in the present record to determine whether it could
constitutionally support a judgment [against appellant]. This Court's duty is not limited
to the elaboration of constitutional principles; we must also in proper cases review the
evidence to make certain that those principles [can be] constitutionally applied."
See Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 160-161, 94 S.Ct. 2750, 2754, 2755, 41 L.Ed.2d 642
(1974); Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 574-575, 578-582, and n. 2, 88
S.Ct. 1731, 1737-1738, 1739-1742, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372
U.S. 229, 235-236, 83 S.Ct. 680, 683, 9 L.Ed.2d 697 (1963).
FN27. Rights of political expression and association may not be abridged because of state
interests asserted by appellate counsel without substantial support in
the record or findings of the state court. See First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 789-790, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 1422-1423, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978); United
Transportation Union v. Michigan Bar, 401 U.S., 576, 581, 91 S.Ct. 1076, 1080, 28 L.Ed.2d
339 (1971); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 1795, 10 L.Ed.2d 965
(1963); Button, 371 U.S., at 442-443, 83 S.Ct., at 342-343; Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375,
388, 82 S.Ct. 1364, 1371, 8 L.Ed.2d 569 (1962); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530, 536,
65 S.Ct. 315, 322, 325, 89 L.Ed. 430 (1945).
Where political expression or association is at issue, this Court has not tolerated the
degree of imprecision that often characterizes government regulation of the conduct of
commercial affairs. The approach we adopt today in Ohralik, 436 U.S. 447, 98 S.Ct. 1912,
that the State may proscribe in- person solicitation for pecuniary gain under
circumstances likely to result in adverse consequences, cannot be applied to appellant's
activity on behalf of the ACLU. Although a showing of potential danger may suffice in the
former context, appellant may not be disciplined unless her activity in fact involved the
type of misconduct at which South Carolina's broad prohibition is said to be directed.
[7] The record does not support appellee's contention that undue influence, overreaching,
misrepresentation, or invasion of privacy actually occurred in this case. Appellant's
letter of August 30, 1973, followed up the earlier meeting--one concededly protected by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments--by notifying Williams that the ACLU would be
interested in supporting possible litigation. The letter imparted additional information
material to making an informed decision about whether to authorize litigation, and
permitted Williams an opportunity, which she exercised, for arriving at a deliberate
decision. The letter was not facially misleading; indeed, it offered "to explain what
is involved so you can understand what is going on." The transmittal of this
letter--as contrasted with in-person solicitation-- involved no appreciable invasion of
privacy; [FN28] nor did it afford any significant opportunity for overreaching or
coercion. Moreover, the fact that there was a written communication lessens substantially
the difficulty of policing solicitation practices that do offend valid rules of
professional conduct. See Ohralik, 436 U.S., at 466-467, 98 S.Ct., at 1924-1925. The
manner of solicitation in this case certainly was no more likely to cause harmful
consequences than the activity considered in Button, see n. 14, supra.
FN28. This record does not provide a constitutionally adequate basis for a finding, not
made below, that appellant deliberately thrust her professional services
on an individual who had communicated unambiguously a decision against litigation. Cf.
Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 90 S.Ct. 1484, 25 L.Ed.2d 736 (1970). For
present purposes, we credit Williams' conflicting testimony to the effect that at the July
meeting she told appellant that because of the condition of her child she "didn't
have time to think about suing" and "if I needed you all I will call you."
App. 74; see n. 7, supra. But even on that view of the testimony, appellant's letter
cannot be characterized as a pressure tactic. A month had elapsed between the meeting and
the letter. Not only was there a possibility that Williams' personal situation might have
changed during this period, but appellant testified that Allen, a close friend of the
Williams family, told her that Williams subsequently communicated to him an interest in
the lawsuit; Allen corroborated this testimony. App. 115-116, 137, 195-196. In light of
these circumstances, and Williams' own acknowledgment that appellant "did not attempt
to persuade or pressure me to file this lawsuit," id., at 52, appellant did not go
beyond the pale of constitution protection in writing a single letter for the purpose of
imparting new information material to a decision whether or not to authorize litigation,
and inquiring "if you are interested, let me know, and I'll let you know when we will
come down to talk to you about it."
Nor does the record permit a finding of a serious likelihood of conflict of interest or
injurious lay interference with the attorney-client relationship. Admittedly, there is
some potential for such conflict or interference whenever a lay organization supports any
litigation. That potential was present in Button, in the NAACP's solicitation of
nonmembers and its disavowal of any relief short of full integration, see 371 U.S., at
420, 83 S.Ct., at 331, id., at 460, 465, 83 S.Ct., at 352, 354 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
But the Court found that potential insufficient in the absence of proof of a "serious
danger" of conflict of interest, id., at 443, 83 S.Ct., at 343, or of organizational
interference with the actual conduct of the litigation, id., at 433, 444, 83 S.Ct., at
338, 343. As in Button, "[n]othing that this record shows as to the nature and
purpose of [ACLU] activities permits an inference of any injurious intervention in or
control of litigation which would constitutionally authorize the application," id.,
at 444, 83 S.Ct., at 344, of the Disciplinary Rules to appellant's activity. [FN29] A
"very distant possibility of harm," Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Assn., 389
U.S., at 223, 88 S.Ct., at 356, cannot justify proscription of the activity of appellant
revealed by this record. See id., at 223-224, 88 S.Ct., at 356-357. [FN30]
FN29. Although the decision whether or not to support a particular litigation is made in
accordance with the ACLU's broader objectives, the organization's
declared policy is to avoid all interference with the attorney-client relationship after
that decision has been made. See 1976 Policy Guide of the American Civil Liberties Union,
Policy # 513, p. 305.
FN30. We are not presented in this case with a situation where the income of the lawyer
who solicits the prospective litigant or who engages in the actual representation of the
solicited client rises or falls with the outcome of the particular litigation. See supra,
at 1903-1904, and n. 24.
The State's interests in preventing the "stirring up" of frivolous or vexatious
litigation and minimizing commercialization of the legal profession offer no further
justification for the discipline administered in this case. The Button Court declined to
accept the proffered analogy to the common-law offenses of maintenance, champerty, and
barratry, where the record would not support a finding that the litigant was solicited for
a malicious purpose or "for private gain, serving no public interest," 371 U.S.,
at 440, 83 S.Ct., at 341; see id., at 439-444, 83 S.Ct., at 341-343. The same result
follows from the facts of this case. And considerations of undue commercialization of the
legal profession are of marginal force where, as here, a nonprofit organization offers its
services free of charge to individuals who may be in need of legal assistance and may lack
the financial means and sophistication necessary to tap alternative sources of such aid.
[FN31]
FN31. Button makes clear that "regulations which reflect hostility to stirring up
litigation have been aimed chiefly at those who urge recourse to the courts for private
gain, serving no public interest," 371 U.S., at 440, 83 S.Ct., at 341, and that
"[o]bjection to the intervention of a lay intermediary . . . also derives from the
element of pecuniary gain," id., at 441, 83 S.Ct., at 342. In recognition of the
overarching obligation of the lawyer to serve the community, see Canon 2 of the ABA Code
of Professional Responsibility, the ethical rules of the legal profession traditionally
have recognized an exception from any general ban on solicitation for offers of
representation, without charge, extended to individuals who may be unable to obtain legal
assistance on their own. See, e. g., In re Ades, 6 F.Supp. 467, 475-476 (Md.1934); Gunnels
v. Atlanta Bar Assn., 191 Ga. 366, 12 S.E.2d 602 (1940); American Bar Association,
Opinions of the Committee on Professional Ethics, Formal Opinion 148, pp. 416-419 (1967).
[8] At bottom, the case against appellant rests on the proposition that a State may
regulate in a prophylactic fashion all solicitation activities of lawyers because there
may be some potential for overreaching, conflict of interest, or other substantive evils
whenever a lawyer gives unsolicited advice and communicates an offer of representation to
a layman. Under certain circumstances, that approach is appropriate in the case of speech
that simply "propose[s] a commercial transaction," Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human
Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 385, 93 S.Ct. 2553, 2558, 37 L.Ed.2d 669 (1973). See
Ohralik, 436 U.S., at 455-459, 98 S.Ct., at 1918-1920. In the context of political
expression and association, however, a State must regulate with significantly greater
precision. [FN32]
FN32. Normally the purpose or motive of the speaker is not central to First Amendment
protection, but it does bear on the distinction between conduct that is "an
associational aspect of 'expression'," Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of
Expression, 74 Yale L.J. 1, 26 (1964), and other activity subject to plenary regulation by
government. Button recognized that certain forms of "cooperative, organizational
activity," 371 U.S., at 430, 83 S.Ct., at 341, including litigation, are part of the
"freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas,"
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1170, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958), and that
this freedom is an implicit guarantee of the First Amendment. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S.
169, 181, 92 S.Ct. 2338, 2346, 33 L.Ed.2d 266 (1972). As shown above,
appellant's speech--as part of associational activity--was expression intended to advance
"beliefs and ideas." In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447, 98 S.Ct.
1912, the lawyer was not engaged in associational activity for the advancement of beliefs
and ideas; his purpose was the advancement of his own commercial interests. The line,
based in part on the motive of the speaker and the character of the expressive activity,
will not always be easy to draw, cf. Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748, 787-788, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 1838, 48 L.Ed.2d 246 (1976) (REHNQUIST, J.,
dissenting), but that is no reason for avoiding the undertaking.
VI
[9][10][11] The State is free to fashion reasonable restrictions with respect to the time,
place, and manner of solicitation by members of its Bar. See Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona, 433 U.S., at 384, 97 S.Ct., at 2709; Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer
Council, 425 U.S., at 771, 96 S.Ct., at 1830, and cases cited therein. The State's special
interest in regulating members whose profession it licenses, and who serve as officers of
its courts, amply justifies the application of narrowly drawn rules to proscribe
solicitation that in fact is misleading, overbearing, or involves other features of
deception or improper influence. [FN33] As we decide today in Ohralik, a State also may
forbid in-person solicitation for pecuniary gain under circumstances likely to result in
these evils. And a State may insist that lawyers not solicit on behalf of lay
organizations that exert control over the actual conduct of any ensuing litigation. See
Button, 371 U.S., at 447, 83 S.Ct., at 345 (WHITE, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Accordingly, nothing in this opinion should be read to foreclose carefully
tailored regulation that does not abridge unnecessarily the associational freedom of
nonprofit organizations, or their members, having characteristics like those of the NAACP
or the ACLU.
FN33. We have no occasion here to delineate the precise contours of permissible state
regulation. Thus, for example, a different situation might be presented if an innocent or
merely negligent misstatement were made by a lawyer on behalf of an organization engaged
in furthering associational or political interests.
We conclude that South Carolina's application of its DR2-103(D)(5)(a) and (c) and
2-104(A)(5) to appellant's solicitation by letter on behalf of the ACLU violates the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. The judgment of the Supreme Court of South Carolina is
Reversed.
Mr. Justice BRENNAN took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Mr. Justice BLACKMUN, concurring.
Although I join the opinion of the Court, my understanding of the first paragraph of Part
VI requires further explanation. The dicta contained in that paragraph are unnecessary to
the decision of this case and its First Amendment overtones. I for one, am not now able to
delineate in the area of political solicitation the extent of state authority to proscribe
misleading statements. Despite the positive language of the text, [FN*] footnote 33
explains that the Court also has refused to draw a line regarding misrepresentation:
FN* "The State's special interest in regulating members whose profession it licenses,
and who serve as officers of its courts, amply justifies the application of narrowly drawn
rules to proscribe solicitation that in fact is misleading . . . ." Ante, at 1908.
"We have no occasion here to delineate the precise contours of permissible state
regulation. Thus, for example, a different situation might be presented if an innocent or
merely negligent misstatement were made by a lawyer on behalf of an organization engaged
in furthering associational or political interests."
It may well be that the State is able to proscribe such solicitation. The resolution of
that issue, however, requires a balancing of the State's interests against the important
First Amendment values that may lurk in even a negligent misstatement. The Court wisely
has postponed this task until an appropriate case is presented and full arguments are
carefully considered.
Mr. Justice REHNQUIST, dissenting.
In this case and the companion case of Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447, 98
S.Ct. 1912, 56 L.Ed.2d 417, the Court tells its own tale of two lawyers: One tale ends
happily for the lawyer and one does not. If we were given the latitude of novelists in
deciding between happy and unhappy endings for the heroes and villains of our tales, I
might well join in the Court's disposition of both cases. But under our federal system it
is for the States to decide which lawyers shall be admitted to the Bar and remain there;
this Court may interfere only if the State's decision is rendered impermissible by the
United States Constitution. We can, of course, develop a jurisprudence of epithets and
slogans in this area, in which "ambulance chasers" suffer one fate and
"civil liberties lawyers" another. But I remain unpersuaded by the Court's
opinions in these two cases that there is a principled basis for concluding that the First
and Fourteenth Amendments forbid South Carolina from disciplining Primus here, but permit
Ohio to discipline Ohralik in the companion case. I believe that both South Carolina and
Ohio acted within the limits prescribed by those Amendments, and I would therefore affirm
the judgment in each case.
This Court said in United Transportation Union v. State Bar of Michigan, 401 U.S. 576,
585, 91 S.Ct. 1076, 1082, 28 L.Ed.2d 339 (1971): "The common threat running through
our decisions in NAACP v. Button [371 U.S. 415, 91 S.Ct. 1076, 28 L.Ed.2d 339 (1963),
Brotherhood of Railroad ] Trainmen [v. Virginia State Bar, 337 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1113, 12
L.Ed.2d 89 (1964),] and United Mine Workers [v. Illinois State Bar Assn., 389 U.S. 217, 88
S.Ct. 353, 19 L.Ed.2d 426 (1967),] is that collective activity undertaken to obtain
meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental right within the protection of the First
Amendment." The Court today ignores the absence of this common thread from the fabric
of this case, and decides that South Carolina may not constitutionally discipline a member
of its Bar for badgering a lay citizen to take part in "collective activity"
which she has never desired to join.
Neither Button nor any other decision of this Court compels a State to permit an attorney
to engage in uninvited solicitation on an individual basis. Further, I agree with the
Court's statement in the companion case that the State has a strong interest in
forestalling the evils that result "when a lawyer, a professional trained in the art
of persuasion, personally solicits an unsophisticated, injured, or distressed lay
person." Ohralik, 436 U.S., at 465, 98 S.Ct., at 1923. The reversal of the judgment
of the Supreme Court of South Carolina thus seems to me quite unsupported by previous
decisions or by any principle which may be abstracted from them.
In distinguishing between Primus' protected solicitation and Ohralik's unprotected
solicitation, the Court lamely declares: "We have not discarded the 'common-sense'
distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area
traditionally subject to government regulation, and other varieties of speech." 436
U.S., at 455-456, 98 S.Ct., at 1918. Yet to the extent that this "common-sense"
distinction focuses on the content of the speech, it is at least suspect under many of
this Court's First Amendment cases, see, e. g. Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S.
92, 96-98, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 2290-2291, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972), and to the extent it focuses
upon the motive of the speaker, it is subject to manipulation by clever practitioners. If
Albert Ohralik, like Edna Primus, viewed litigation " 'not [as] a technique of
resolving private differences,' " but as " 'a form of political expression' and
'political association,' " ante, at 1902, quoting Button, supra, at 429, 431, 83
S.Ct., at 336, for all that appears he would be restored to his right to practice. And we
may be sure that the next lawyer in Ohralik's shoes who is disciplined for similar conduct
will come here cloaked in the prescribed mantle of "political association" to
assure that insurance companies do not take unfair advantage of policyholders.
This absence of any principled distinction between the two cases is made all the more
unfortunate by the radical difference in scrutiny brought to bear upon state regulation in
each area. Where solicitation proposes merely a commercial transaction, the Court
recognizes "the need for prophylactic regulation in furtherance of the State's
interest in protecting the lay public." Ohralik, 436 U.S., at 468, 98 S.Ct., at 1925.
On the other hand, in some circumstances (at least in those identical to the instant case)
[FN1] "[w]here political expression or association is at issue," a member of the
Bar "may not be disciplined unless her activity in fact involve[s] the type of
misconduct at which South Carolina's broad prohibition is said to be directed." Ante,
at 1906.
FN1. The Court carefully reserves judgment on factual circumstances in any way
distinguishable from those presented here. For instance, the Court suggests that different
considerations would arise if Primus herself had received any benefit
from the solicitation, or if her income depended in any way on the outcome of the
litigation. Ante, at 1903 n. 21, 1907 n. 30. Likewise, the Court emphasizes that the
lawyers conducting the litigation would have taken no share had attorney's fees been
awarded by the court. Ante, at 1904 n. 24. Finally, the Court points out that Williams had
not "communicated unambiguously a decision against litigation," ante, at 1906 n.
28, that the solicitation was not effected in person, ante, at 1906, and that legal
services were offered free of charge, ante, at 1907. All these reservations seem to imply
that a State might be able to raise an absolute prohibition against any of these factual
variations, even "[i]n the context of political expression and association."
Ante, at 1908. But see ante, p. 1909 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring). On the other hand, in
Ohralik, 436 U.S., at 462-463 n. 20, 98 S.Ct., at 1922, the Court appears to give a
broader reading to today's holding. "We hold today in Primus that a lawyer who
engages in solicitation as a form of protected political association generally may not be
disciplined without proof of actual wrongdoing that the State constitutionally may
proscribe."
I do not believe that any State will be able to determine with confidence the area in
which it may regulate prophylactically and the area in which it may regulate only upon a
specific showing of harm. Despite the Court's assertion to the contrary, ante, at 1908 n.
32, the difficulty of drawing distinctions on the basis of the content of the speech or
the motive of the speaker is a valid reason for avoiding the undertaking where a more
objective standard is readily available. I believe that constitutional inquiry must focus
on the character of the conduct which the State seeks to regulate, and not on the motives
of the individual lawyers or the nature of the particular litigation involved. The State
is empowered to discipline for conduct which it deems detrimental to the public interest
unless foreclosed from doing so by our cases construing the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.
In Button this Court recognized the right of the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People to engage in collective activity, including the solicitation of
potential plaintiffs from outside its ranks, for the purpose of instituting and
maintaining litigation to achieve the desegregation of public schools. The NAACP utilized
letters, bulletins, and petition drives, 371 U.S., at 422, 83 S.Ct., at 332, apparently
directed toward both members and nonmembers of the organization, id., at 433, 83 S.Ct., at
338, [FN2] to organize public meetings for the purpose of soliciting plaintiffs. As
described in Button, lawyers played only a limited role in this solicitation:
FN2. Of all our cases recognizing the protected status of "collective activity
undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the courts," United Transportation Union v.
Michigan Bar, 401 U.S. 576, 585, 91 S.Ct. 1076, 1082, 28 L.Ed.2d 339 (1971), only Button
involves the solicitation of nonmembers of the organization. See United Transportation
Union, supra, at 577-578, 91 S.Ct., at 1078; United Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Assn.,
389 U.S. 217, 218, 88 S.Ct. 353, 354, 19 L.Ed.2d 426 (1967); Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia
Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 7, 84 S.Ct. 1113, 1117, 12 L.Ed.2d 89 (1964).
"Typically, a local NAACP branch will invite a member of the legal staff to explain
to a meeting of parents and children the legal steps necessary to achieve desegregation.
The staff member will bring printed forms to the meeting, authorizing him, and other NAACP
or Defense Fund attorneys of his designation, to represent the signers in legal
proceedings to achieve desegregation." Id., at 421, 83 S.Ct., at 332.
The Court held that the organization could not be punished by the Commonwealth of Virginia
for solicitation on the basis of its role in instituting desegregation litigation. [FN3]
FN3. In Button the Commonwealth did not attempt to discipline the individual lawyers for
their role in the solicitation. The Court's statement that "the activities of the . .
. legal staff shown on this record are modes of expression and association protected by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments which Virginia may not prohibit," 371 U.S., at
428-429, 83 S.Ct., at 335, is therefore technically dictum. Thus, the Court's conclusion
today that a State may not discipline a member of its Bar for soliciting an individual not
already engaged in the sort of collective activity protected under our cases is as
unprecedented as it is unsound.
Here, South Carolina has not attempted to punish the ACLU or any laymen associated with
it. Gary Allen, who was the instigator of the effort to sue Dr. Pierce, remains as free as
before to solicit potential plaintiffs for future litigation. Likewise, Primus remains as
free as before to address gatherings of the sort described in Button to advise potential
plaintiffs of their legal rights. Primus' first contact with Williams took place at such a
gathering, and South Carolina evidently in response to Button, has not attempted to
discipline her for her part in that meeting. It has disciplined her for initiating further
contact on an individual basis with Williams, who had not expressed any desire to become
involved in the collective activity being organized by the ACLU. While Button appears to
permit such individual solicitation for political purposes by lay members of the
organization, id., at 422, 83 S.Ct., at 332, it nowhere explicitly permits such activity
on the part of lawyers.
As the Court understands the Disciplinary Rule enforced by South Carolina, "a lawyer
employed by the ACLU or a similar organization may never give unsolicited advice to a lay
person that he or she retain the organization's free services." Ante, at 1905. That
prohibition seems to me entirely reasonable. A State may rightly fear that members of its
Bar have powers of persuasion not possessed by laymen, see Ohralik, 436 U.S., at 464-465,
98 S.Ct., at 1923, and it may also fear that such persuasion may be as potent in writing
as it is in person. Such persuasion may draw an unsophisticated layman into litigation
contrary to his own best interests, compare ante, at 1906-1908, with Ohralik, 436 U.S., at
464- 467, 98 S.Ct., at 1923-1925, and it may force other citizens of South Carolina to
defend against baseless litigation which would not otherwise have been brought. I cannot
agree that a State must prove such harmful consequences in each case simply because an
organization such as the ACLU or the NAACP is involved.
I cannot share the Court's confidence that the danger of such consequences is minimized
simply because a lawyer proceeds from political conviction rather than for pecuniary gain.
A State may reasonably fear that a lawyer's desire to resolve "substantial civil
liberties questions," 268 S.C. 259, 263, 233 S.E.2d 301, 303 (1977), may occasionally
take precedence over his duty to advance the interests of his client. It is even more
reasonable to fear that a lawyer in such circumstances will be inclined to pursue both
culpable and blameless defendants to the last ditch in order to achieve his ideological
goals. [FN4] Although individual litigants, including the ACLU, may be free to use the
courts for such purposes, South Carolina is likewise free to restrict the activities of
the members of its Bar who attempt to persuade them to do so.
FN4. In the case with which Primus was concerned, the last ditch was the denial of
certiorari in this Court after the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had held that
Pierce had not in fact acted under color of state law. Walker v. Pierce, 560 F.2d 609 (CA4
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1075, 98 S.Ct. 1266, 55 L.Ed.2d 782 (1978).
I can only conclude that the discipline imposed upon Primus does not violate the
Constitution, and I would affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of South Carolina.